Tuesday, October 7, 2008

Bond

Bank lends your money to others to earn an income and in return promise you a lower fix interest rate.  This promise is usually govern by authority to make sure bank fullfills that promise.  Else someone else may take over to continue pay you the promised return.

When a company does the same, its call bond.  When a company needs to raise some money, they issue bonds to you.  You buy their bond and they promise you a fix return.  Bond is also govern by similar authority as the Fix Deposit in banks.  However, if a company fails to fullfill their promised return to you, there may or may not be anyone step in to continue paying you the promised return.  Sometimes glitch may happens in bond too.  ie. a global event like huge disaster affected the whole finance world and globally the bond pay out rate is revised downward.  For that short few months, those bond funds due in maturity may be affected - paid out in lower rate than promised and there is nothing much you can do to pursue your right.

Bond Fund to Bond is just like Mutual Fund to Stocks.  So a Fund Manager helps you to select all the Good bonds so that your bond return is almost as good as Fix Deposit, but with higher return.

A large sum of Fix Deposit is actually correlated to bonds, that's why in stable market, bond fund return is usually a little bit higher than Fix Deposit interest rate.


Mutual Fund ...

Some observes that I put Mutual Fund in between FD and Stocks in my Pyramid.  So they ask why I jumped from Bankings Fix Deposit to Stock Market without talking about Mutual Fund first. 

No particular strong reason really, but my final proposal to Personal Finance is a bit related to Mutual Fund, so perhaps that's why I want to end the pyramid with Mutual Fund !?

Anyway, remember that bank has one special investment division just to buy shares to earn money.  Well, there are also company out there doing the same but not for the bank but for general public like us. Instead of receiving incoming money from Saving Accounts, mutual fund company receives investment money directly from us.  Then the money is used to buy the share of BEST companies in stock market.  Then the profit is share with all the investors.

So theoritically if Bank earns 12% and give you back only 3% in FD, 
then Mutual Fund company should be able to give you a return of 12% !!

People who work in Mutual Fund company need salary too.  So they get paid from the total pool of investment money too.  So you should get 12% return minus the cost of running such a mutual fund company.

There is only one minor correction.  Mutual Fund company does NOT receive money directly from you.  Because if they do, they may run away with your money without actually investing in stock market.  So to protect our rights, our money is actually given to a 3rd party called Trustee.  This Trustee is like a saving account in our names.  So it can only be paid out to us.  However, we also tell this Trustee that the Mutual Fund company we appointed can 'redirect' our money to stock market.  Therefore, Mutual Fund company invest our money without actually owning our money.

Remember I said all our money goes to bank ?  Well normally this Trustee is closely related to banks, if not already a part of them.

The brain of a mutual fund is the Fund Manager.  It could be one person or a team.  How good the performance of a mutual fund depends on how good the Fund Manager is.  Normally a mutual fund will buy 10-20 stocks.  So in a way, when you buy One mutual fund, your money is spread out to the 10-20 stocks that mutual fund buys.

So you may say, "so I diversify my investment even with only little money !!"

Sorry, Wrong again !!  That is still a convinient Myth about diversification.  One may argue its way to make above statement true but definitely not the Right way to perceive it in Personal Finance point of view.

When you buy a mutual fund, you buy the trust of the Fund Manager.  Basically you think that this particular Fund Manager can do as well as the bank and give you good return.  Once you trust him, that is counted as one !  No matter how much or how little money you put in, you trusted only One Fund Manager.  The Fund Manager may use your money to buy only one stock, it may buy 10-20 stocks.  Remember how the stocks are being purchased ?  They will always buy the BEST stock first, then followed by 2nd best etc.  So if you start with a very new Fund Manager, most probably he also start with only one stock.

So why bother mutual fund ?  Because buying mutual fund is easier and usually start with smaller amount of money.

1.  There are less than a hundred mutual funds to choose from while there are thousands of stocks.
2.  There are already many benchmark helping you to decide which mutual fund has done well in the past
3.  Mutual fund survives by having your business so they will proactively tell you what they do and why you should use their services.  Comparing to stock investment, the business owner doesn't really want to tell you their businesses strategy and master plan before it happen.  Mutual fund tells you up front what they plan to do with your fund.


Last tip is ... if you find a good Fund Manager, stick with Him, NOT the FUND !


Monday, October 6, 2008

so you don't have a GOAL ?

I mentioned before even if you don't have a goal, you should still do step 1 and 2 which are compulsory in Personal Finance.  All other steps are optional and subject to discussion, debate and negotiation ... The compulsory steps are;

2.  Setup an Automatic Saving Mechanism ( ie. Standing Instruction )

That will at least make you a millionaire when you retire. ( millionaire by the time you retire is not as much as what you think know )  Or that will help you 'lost less' by cutting the inflation effect by half !

If you want to move on to 'save more', you will have to have goals.  Else not only you may not 'earn more', you may even lose the firm fundamental ground you have built from step 1 and 2.

However, I am still not going to talk about goal yet.  Let's talk about Life instead ...

First draw a circle to represend your life ...


Then write down all the big events that Should Happen in your life ...  It doesn't matter what they are.  Just write down whatever that comes to your mind now.  They don't have to be correct and you can change later.  But you must write something down !



There you go !  You have a picutre representation of your life !

So next start think about what you like to do with your life.  What you love to do now !  Will you still do it in future ?  What are the things that you wish to do but you are not doing now ?  Start putting them into your Life Line too !

So what's next ?  Good question !  But don't ask me, ask yourself !  What do you want to get out of your own Life Line that you have just drawn.  I started this but YOU WILL HAVE TO ANSWER THIS LAST QUESTION NOW ...

...

Those who don't like circle can also draw life line in a straight line.  It doesn't matter how you draw the line, as long as you write down the big events and what you love to do now and future.




So what does your Life Line looks like and what did you get out of it ?


Myth of Diversification -> Eggs and Baskets

In last post, I claim that stock market is the backbone of a country's economy.  That post was not very well written as I was trying to combine 3 articles into 1.  There are actually 3 angles or point of views how stock market can be viewed as a country's economy.  If you still don't agree, please let me know, I shall write more on that.  But if you do agree, then let's move on ...
All investment vehicles eventually go to stock market.  Bank invests your money in stock market, gains 12% ( assumption ) and share only 3% back to you in your FD.  Its fair because your 3% is guarantee but his 12% is not.

First bank does a lot of analysis and selects the BEST business in stock market.  Then bank buy its shares and wait.  As the business grows in time, bank shares the benefits.  As time goes, bank has more money too.  There will come a stage bank can no longer buy the shares of the BEST business.  Because bank only wants to lend money to the company, bank DOES NOT WANT TO RUN THAT BUSINESS.  So the maximum shares a bank should buy is 49%.  So what does the bank do then ?

Bank buys the shares of 2nd BEST business in stock market.  So eventually bank would have bought quite a lot of shares of a lot of businesses.  Sometimes thats call diversification or Don't Put All Your Eggs in One Basket.

Similarly in your own finanace planning, you have already filled up the bottom part of your pyramid (previous post: now Finance Planning starts) and you still have extra money.  So you should buy some shares too.  But wait a minute ....
Which is the BEST share you should buy ?
What analysis to perform to find out the BEST share ?
You can check what the bank has bought and you saw a list of stocks that the bank has bought.  You can just buy according to that list and you will earn as much as the bank, Right ?  If you buy the same or similar list, you are also spreading your eggs in different basket, Right ?  You are diversifying your risk ...

WRONG !!  As a matter of fact, ABSOLUTELY WRONG !!

Remember I said stock market is a good example of finance creation ?  Such stable existence MUST come with certain unchangable LAWs.  In short, you MUST follow exactly what the bank has done (the process) !  You can NEVER skip any steps.  And you should NEVER copy result.

How to Buy Stock will come soon but for now, think of it this way.

You have one egg.  Can you put that egg into two different baskets ?  No !  ONE egg can only goes to ONE basket !  And you need to pick which basket to put in.  Only when you have your 2nd egg, then you can consider putting it into the same basket as before or put it in a new basket !

When you start buying stock with limited fund, you should only buy one stock.  And thats better be the BEST one you can ever find !  If you don't know how to find that BEST stock yet, then its not the time to buy yet.  Do you think Bank will simply buy a list of stocks just because another bank buys too ?

Don't Put All Eggs in One Basket

is not the same as

Put your Egg in all baskets

The right way to diversify is :
1. Analyse what you like and what the business does.
2. Pick the BEST one to invest in
3. When you have had enough with #2, then pick the 2nd Best, 3rd, 4th etc ....
4. Revise constantly on this 'Who's BEST' list

In Malaysia, assuming your minimum 0.42% brokerage fee is RM 40,
then ONE EGG is equivalent to RM 10,000


Sunday, October 5, 2008

Who Could Have Seen This Coming?

In a front page article this past Friday, The New York Times suggested that an obscure decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission in ’04 to loosen the debt limits of the broker/dealers had set the stage for the meltdown in financial markets.

The story had lots of tidbits in the tradition of the best tabloids: a bright spring afternoon, a basement meeting, a pensive commissioner and a Cassandra in the form of a software developer – a clueless geek with extra time on his hands, really – who wrote to warn the commissioners that they were about to make a grave mistake.

Whether the piece was a hatchet job on Christopher Cox, the SEC chairman – it probably was – is not important. (The article opened by quoting Cox talking about the broker/dealers – “we have a good deal of comfort about the capital cushions at these firms at the moment” – and went on to ask, How could Mr. Cox have been so wrong? The answer is that Cox was wrong, but when it came to ignorance about what was about to happen, he had nothing on a long list of policy makers, academics and financial executives with more direct roles in the coming crisis. Bear’s CEO did not know what hit him, even after his firm had gone under.)

I bring up this article to once again highlight the perils of theoretical poverty. In the absence of a firm understanding of what is taking place in the financial markets, we are liable to mistake the manifestation of the events for their cause. The mistake leads to wrong conclusions and wrong remedies. The Times article and the Treasury's $700 billion bailout plans are the proverbial “Exhibit A” in each case.

The Theory of Speculative Capital is the only theory that explains what is happening in the financial markets, i.e., what is changing. It identifies the driver of the change (speculative capital), the consequences of its operation (in legal, social and financial areas) and points to its direction (self destruction). It is only then that we could begin devising solutions.

So, what could the Theory of Speculative Capital do in relation with the current crisis?

Below, I am quoting select passages from Vol. 1 of Speculative Capital. Note the references to money markets and shadow banking. Most important of all, note the role of the Federal Reserve in creating the high-leveraged broker/dealer industry by allowing previously ineligible securities to be pledged as collateral for borrowing. That was full 8 years before the SEC rule changes.
Systemic risk is the risk of a chain reaction of bankruptcies which then disrupt the process of circulation of capital.

In a pamphlet published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Gerald Corrigan, then president of the bank, wrote:
The hard fact of the matter is that linkages created by the large-dollar payments systems are such that a serious credit problem at any of the large users of the system has the potential to disrupt the system as a whole.
Corrigan was specifically writing about a “gridlock” problem in CHIPS, the interbank clearing system in New York. That is what he meant by the “large-dollar payments systems.” He was concerned that the default of a major bank with a myriad of large payments could cause a chain reaction of defaults in CHIPS. The term systemic risk he is said to have coined referred to the risk arising from such cross-defaults: the risk of disruption in the clearing system.

That is a narrow understanding of systemic risk. It is on the same footing as regarding finance as the study of cash flows; it reduces diverse aspects of the subject into a quantitative flash point. The problem so narrowly delineated is easily solved. But for that very reason, the cause of the problem escapes scrutiny, only to surface more menacingly at a higher level.

It is impossible to understand systemic risk without knowing speculative capital and understanding the financial, regulatory, legal and political aspects of its operation.
…

The “system” in systemic risk is the process of circulation of capital and the markets which form the circuitry of the process – the course of its movement. Alternatively, we can say that the system is a web of markets linked together by the thread of speculative capital. Thus, the “system” has two components: process and markets.

A system defined by such terms as circuitry and flow lends itself to superficial analogies. Often, electrical circuits are used to depict it. Occasionally, one hears of traffic systems and “gridlock.” Writing in the Wall Street Journal, George Soros gave it a human touch and compared it to the body’s blood circulation system–with the US, naturally, being the heart.

But the system of concern to us is a social one; it has little in common with physical or biological systems. The “market” component of the system varies greatly in size, from a stock exchange in a country to the country’s national currency. The strength of the market’s linkage to the system is shaped by its size, regulatory structure, the political environment in which it functions and the country’s proximity to existing centers of international trade and finance. There are numerous secondary factors as well, which, sometimes reinforcing and sometimes offsetting one another, further contribute to shaping the characteristics of the system.

...

The CHIPS manager who proudly announces the establishment of credit lines to cover the failure of two largest net debits must ask himself this question: under what conditions two largest net debits in CHIPS – say, J. P. Morgan and Chase – would fail? What would cause such failures? That is the question that we answer in examining systemic risk.

Systemic risk comes into existence as a result of formation of basis risk in leveraged positions.

…

Webster’s definition of leverage as “increasing means of accomplishing some purpose” in finance refers to increasing the rate of return of capital through the use of credit capital. Such increase, when credit capital interacts with industrial or commercial capital, is always modest because the amount of credit capital available to a factory owner or a wholesaler is limited by their equity. That is why some factory owners and wholesaler could avoid debt “as a matter of principle.” One could say that these businessmen have the mentality of pre-capitalist peasants; they have not grasped the advantages of borrowed capital. But more to the point, they could afford to have that mentality because the contribution of credit capital to their bottom line is modest.

No manager of speculative capital, on the other hand, can afford to avoid leverage. With regards to speculative capital, credit capital is more than a booster of return. It is a vital component of support, an engine of sorts, without which speculative capital cannot operate. This new role develops logically and naturally, and in consequence of the real-life conditions under which speculative capital generates profits.

In real life, the arbitrageable spreads yield returns which are considerably below the average rate of return of capital. It would be an unimaginably gross inefficiency of the markets if it were otherwise. The very operation of speculative capital further tends to diminish its rate of return. The small-time speculator – a pit trader in a futures exchange, for example – compensates for the narrowness of the spreads by trading constantly and incessantly.

The mass of speculative capital cannot act in that way. It is impossible to turn over the multi-billion dollar portfolio of a hedge fund many times a day or even a week. So speculative capital searches for venues that will allow it to increase its return without increasing its size. One such venue is through enlisting the aid of credit capital. Acting as a lever, credit capital raises the return to levels which speculative capital in itself cannot produce. The mathematics of leverage is widely known in the market. According the The Wall Street Journal:
Before [February 1994], speculators had been borrowing at a short-term rate of like 3% and buying five-year Treasury notes yielding around 5%, a gaping spread of two percentage points that enabled some to double their money in a year. The math was tantalizing. Using leverage, an investor with $1 million could borrow enough to acquire $50 million in five-year Treasury notes. And the spread of two percentage points could generate about $1 million in profits on the $1 million investment, as long as rates remained stable or declined.
To a bank loan officer who lends on the traditional criteria, that leverage is incomprehensible, almost madness. No business could generate sufficient profits to service debt 50 times the owner’s equity. But arbitrage is no ordinary business. In fact, it is not even a business. It is a refined version of the banks’ own practice of borrowing low and lending high, so the banks readily recognize it. The strategy is “refined,” because now the profits are guaranteed to be riskless “no matter what happens to interest rates.”

…

That is why and how speculative capital comes to depend on credit capital for survival. The expansion of credit capital becomes a condition for its own expansion. Credit capital, too, assumes a support function unlike any it had before. It becomes imperative for it to “be there” when called upon and to follow speculative capital into new arbitrage ventures such as leveraged finance, leveraged buyouts and junk bonds. These markets are the manifestation of the incestuous relation between credit and speculative capital: they revolve around credit capital but, without speculative capital in the lead, they could not have been developed. In the speculative frenzy of the 1920s, for example, the role of credit capital did not go beyond the traditional boosting of returns through margins because the independent form of speculative capital did not exist. Just how closely the junk bond market is associated with speculation is shown by the following:
“High-yield bonds should outperform during the next six weeks, but in the next six months, I’d concentrate on higher-quality bonds because I’m still worried about corporate earnings next year,” says Joseph Balestrino of Federated Investors.
Prior to the advent of speculative capital, bonds of all kinds were purchased and held for years, even decades. Balestrino’s horizon, when speaking of junk bonds, is six weeks.

The most important aspect of the relation between credit and speculative capital is the quantitative one. Because speculative capital constantly expands, credit capital, too, must expand.

…

Where does the credit capital for sustaining such colossal expansion come from? The ambiguity and apparent subjectivity of the word “credit” at times make it seem that it is created out of thin air. The practice of banks in creating credit money further reinforces that illusion.

In reality, “credit” is credit capital. Its creation, expansion and movement have their own laws and are governed by a complex set of rules. Their detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this book. Here, we are only concerned with the source of the expansion of credit capital and the consequences of that expansion. The source of expansion is the easy credit policy of the Federal Reserve. “Easy credit” involves more than reducing interest rates. It also includes technical rule changes which provide fresh sources of credit. In April 1996, for example, the Wall Street Journal reported:
“The Federal Reserve moved to ease scores of regulations affecting margin requirements, calling it “one of the most significant reductions in regulatory burdens on broker-dealers since 1934.”
Apparently unconvinced of the significance of the Fed’s announcement, the Journal relegated the story to page 18. It said, in part:
The final rules … will eliminate restrictions on a broker-dealer’s ability to arrange for an extension of credit by another lender; let dealers lend on any convertible bond if the underlying stock is suitable for margin; increase the loan value of money-market mutual funds from a 50% margin requirement to a ‘good faith’ standard … and allow dealers to lend on any investment-grade debt security … the Fed will allow the lending of foreign securities to foreign persons for any purposes against any legal collateral … It will also expand the criteria for determining which securities qualify for securities credit, a change that will sharply increase the number of foreign stocks that are margin-eligible.
The changes described in the article were too technical to be individually analyzed here. (That is probably why the news received very little attention.) The important point is the purpose of the rule changes: to open the floodgates of credit capital. The Fed was correct about the significance of the decision.

As one example, note that the new rules allowed the money market mutual funds “to be treated like their underlying securities for margin purposes.” The US Treasury bills in such funds could be purchased with a 90 percent margin. A mutual fund with $1 million in investment can buy up to $10 million in Treasury bills. When the mutual fund itself is treated like its underlying security, its shares can in return be pledged as margin for buying securities ten times their value. The result is a leverage ratio approaching 100 to 1.

Rule changes by the Federal Reserve do not take place on a whim. In fact, they never take place without a strong impetus: in this case, the pressure of speculative capital whose expansion called for ever larger amounts of credit capital. In the familiar scenario of speculative capital forcefully breaking down the regulatory walls, the Fed had to give room and reduce the “regulatory burdens.” An unrelated New York Times article, published a few weeks after the rule changes were announced, told of the source of the pressure:
Everyone who has even thumbed casually through the books of securities firms recently agrees they are more highly leveraged than ever … It is [the] matched-book portion of firms’ balance sheets, where assets and liabilities are paired … that has soared in recent years … [two] consultants…have suggested that the bloating of the industry’s asset-liability structure reflects an unprecedented and somewhat involuntary commitment to “yield arbitrage,” or the practice of taking advantage of small differences in interest rates … Securities firm executives insist and analysts generally agree that this business generates little market risk, just a dollop of credit risk and perhaps more operations related risk than anything else.
The two consultants quoted in the article noticed the role of yield curve arbitrage in increasing the leverage of the securities firms. Their observation that the firms’ commitment to this strategy is “somewhat involuntary” is especially perceptive. Of course, speculative capital engages in great many arbitrage opportunities; yield curve arbitrage is only the most readily recognizable one.

The increase in leverage surpasses anything seen in the bond market: “The demand for financing, and for leveraged purchases of bonds, has reached a ridiculous level.” But the Federal Reserve is forced to loosen the rules even further:
The Federal Reserve Board proposed new capital guidelines … that would provide the biggest break to banks that sell triple-A rated asset-backed securities. Currently, banks … are assessed an 8% capital charge on the security’s full value. Under the proposed guidelines, the 8% charge would be … [reduced to] an effective [rate of] 1.6% … a Fed financial analyst who helped write the proposed rules [said]: “This rule will fit in nicely with the way the market is moving.”
The analyst is right on the mark. In fact, he is more right than he could suspect. In saying that the rule changes “fit in nicely with the way the market is moving,” he has in mind the general deregulatory trend and the need of banks for constantly increasing amounts of credit capital. But there is one other, more fundamental, movement in part of the market which is not readily discernible. That movement is the gradual advancing of the markets toward a sudden disruption.

These lines were written in 1997-99. Speculative Capital offered the only critical examination of the events taking place in the financial markets at that time. Otherwise, no one in the academia, regulatory and credit rating agencies, and certainly no one on Wall Street, questioned the leveraged-based business model that speculative capital was imposing on the markets.

Read again, “Securities firm executives insist ... little market risk ... just a dollop of credit risk” and think of the cast of characters: Fuld, Komansky, Prince, Weill, Greenberg, Schwartz, Paulson, Corzine, Purcell. Nothing exposes the poor players who strutted their little hour upon the stage of Global Finance more mercilessly than a global crisis.

But this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. In Vols. 4 and 5 of Speculative Capital, I will take on the subject of systemic risk in all its dimensions, not only economic and financial, but social and cultural as well.

Stock market is the back bone of a country's economy

Back to fundamentals ... we last talk about inflation, BLR and how bank works ...

You save money with bank.  Bank promised you 3%.  Bank lends money to businesses and gain 6% from them.  As you can imagine, bank must do a good job lending the money to 'good' businesses who can repay back the loan else bank may lose money.  'Good' businesses are those who make good use of the money to 'grow' bigger and earn more.

When a business grows big enough, it can borrow money from a better source - stock market.  Once a business is listed in a stock market, its total worth is converted to shares.  For example;
Company A worth $1 million now and it get listed in KLSE for 1 million shares, so each share is $1 each.
By the way, 'share' is just a piece of paper stating that its worth $1.  Company A did not really pay $1 out from its pocket.  On the contrary, if you like Company A and its business, you can buy that share and pay $1 for it.  Company A will have $1 extra and you will have 1 share.  It also mean you own 1 out of 1 million of Company A.  When you owns 51% of the shares, you literary own Company A.  Pretty cool huh !

So assuming all 1 millions shares are sold out instantly, that means Company A suddenly receive extra $1 million, IN ADDITION to its original worth.  If the business do well next year says its worth becomes $2 million, divided by the 1 million shares it issued.  Each share is worth $2 now.  So you have gain 100% profit from $1 to $2.
So Stock Market consists of a list of businesses 
that have been proven having substainable growth in the past, 
and relatively having large net worth.
So Bank buy stocks directly from stock market too as if it lends the money out.  Where else but stock market which already have so many 'good' businesses for them to lend their money to.  And usually get a much better than BLR return - if they continously choose the right stocks.

In a mature market, all the big businesses are listed in stock exchange ( place where you buy and sell shares ).  And all these businesses group together can represent the whole of economy.  Because whatever you eat, do and buy ... you get it from small sellers who eventually get the items from the bigger players, ie. the listed businesses.

So however small or big an economy issue is, it will be reflected in the stock market.

This is also the 1st example of "Creating Something From Nothing", a good one indeed!  Assuming 'Most' of the listed companies are 'good' companies then this Stock Exchange will continue to exist.  Everybody earns something.  Banks have more choices to lend the money to and therefore earns more.  Businesses can raise more money than before without committing to pay any interest.  General public can own the businesses they like at a very small fraction that they can afford.  Its a wonderful picture ...

As long as 'most' of the listed companies 
continue to be 'good' companies ...


Saturday, October 4, 2008

Car Loan vs House Loan interest rate

This may be a little bit too technical for some but definitely useful for those who really care about their money and has something to do with or going to have car loan.

In Malaysia, vehicle loan rate is calculated flat, forward sum to the future.  For example,
You borrow RM 100,000 vehicle loan for 7 years at 3%.  Your total repayment for the whole period is 100,000 x ( 1 +  7 x 0.03 ) = RM 121,000.  There are 84 months in 7 years, so every month you have to pay 121,000 / 8 = RM 1,440
Don't get confuse with this 3% car loan rate with the Fix Deposit rate, or BLR or House Loan interest rate.  Because the calculation method is different, they are not comparable to each other.

In short, in order to compare your car loan interest rate to your house loan rate, you need to convert the car loan rate into a compound rate.

Table below is a reference for such conversion.

For example, the highlighted in yelow says that.  If your Car Loan interest rate is 3% and you are taking a 3 years loan, then it is equivalent to 5.68% house loan interest rate.

My rule of thumb on this topic is :  Simply multiply car loan rate by 1.9 to convert them into a house loan interest rate.

Have fun continue to be puzzled and confused by above table ..  have a great weekend !!

The above table and figures are one of the TOP SECRET in personal finance that even most 
Bankers don't have, not to mention your financial planner, insurance or mutual fund agent.  But if they do, please let me know ...